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[So F. No. 18963.

In Bank.

Mar. 15, 1955.1

EDWARD F. McKEON, Respondent,
Appellant.

)

V.

BEN L. aIUSTO,

[la, Ib] Contracts - Modification - Oral Modification of Written
Contract.-Civ. Code, § 1698, declaring that contract in writing
may be altered by contract in writing or by executed oral
agreement, presupposes existing contract in writing, and accordingly does not invalidate new oral agreement made after
written contract has expired by its terms or has been orally
abrogated, cancelled or rescinded.
[2] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Termination.
-Written contract for employment of plaintiff for one year
for stated salary pIns percentage of profits of defendant's
bnsiness terminates at end of year unless parties agree that
it shall continue.
[3] ld.-Contracts of Employment-Renewal of Agreement.-Fact
that plaintiff continues in defendant's employ after end of year
provided in written contract of employment for one year
indicates, standing alone, that parties agreed to continuation
of written contract. (See Lab. Code, § 3003.)
[4] ld.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Evidence.-In
action to recover profits alleged to be due under terms of oral
extension of written contract of employment for one year
providing for stated salary plus sum which, when added to
salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits of defendant's
business, evidence that plaintiff continued in defendant's employ after end of year in reliance on defendant's promise that
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 181 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 428.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 189; [2] Master and
Servant, § 29; [31 Muster and Servant, ~ 30.5; [4, 7] Master and
Ser.rnnt, §52; [5] Master Dnd Servant, ~55; [6] Contracts. §278;
[8] Mn:;t(~r and Servant, (3: [9] Master and Servant, § 20(2) ;
[10J .Master and Servant, § 53.
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plaintiff would get his share of profits on uncompleted jobs
indicates that parties did not intend that provisions of written
contract should be applicable between last day of year and
time new oral agreement was made, and .Justifies court's COllelusion that written contract expired at end of year.
Id.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Findings.-In
action to recover profits alleged to be due under terms of oral
extension of written contract of employment for one year
providing for stated salary plus sum which, when added to
salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits of defendant's
business, findings referring to oral agreement as modification
of written contract may, in view of finding that oral agreement
was not made until after expiration of written contract, be
reasonably interpreted as meaning, not that oral agreement
was modification of existing written contract, but that new terms
of employment were in part different from those set out in
expired written contract, and as so interpreted findings are
eonsistent with and support judgment for plaintiff.
Contracts-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact.- Whether
parties intended their oral agreement immediately to be effective or only to become binding on reducing it to writing is
ordinarily question of fact to be resolved by court or jury in
light of surrounding circumstances.
Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Evidence.-In action to recover profits alleged to be due
under terms of oral extension of written contract of employment for one year providing for stated salary plus sum which,
when added to salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits
of defendant's business, a finding that parties reached binding
oral understanding in January following end of year covering
profits on. jobs commenced in year of contract but not completed until following year, and that defendant wrongfully
terminated this oral agreement at end of February, is sustained by evidence that in December defendant told plaintiff
he would get his share of profits on uncompleted jobs and
hence must have known, when plaintiff continued in his employ at end of year, that plaintiff was relying on such promise,
and by evidence that in January plaintiff asked for and was
given an advance on anticipated profits of certain job.
Id. - Contracts of Employment - Validity.-Where evidence
establishes new oral agreement of employment following
termination of original written contract, fact that parties might
thereafter be unable to agree on clarification of oral agreement would not affect its validity.
Id.-Contracts of Employment - Compensation - Amount.Where evidenc(' establighes new oral agrpement of employment
following termination of original written contract, employee's
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testimony that he was unwilling to make any "more" agreements until be ka.ew what he "had coming from what was on
the books," made in response to employer's proposal that
profit-sharing arrangement be changed, is consistent with employee's position that he was entitled to share in profits under
oral agreement.
[10] Id.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Questions of
Law and Fact.-In action to recover profits alleged to be due
under terms of oral extension of written contract of employment for one year providing for stated salary plus sum which,
when added to salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits
of defendant's business, where plaintiff testified that he left defendant's employ because "I couldn't get an accounting, and I
wasn't going to get any more contract or any renewal, and I
had to think about going out and getting another job," it was
for trial court to resolve ambiguity of such testimony in light
of all evidence, and since, at time to which plaintiff referred,
defendant had clearly indicated that he was not going to
execute any written profit-sharing agreement as he had promised to do or recognize plaintiff's right to share in profits on
job not completed in year covered by written contract, it
could not be held as matter of law that trial court erred in
interpreting such testimony as referring to new written contract which was to supersede oral agreement.

!
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to recover profits alleged to be due under tenns
of oral extension of written contract of employment. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
W. Burleigh Pattee, Bruce M. Casey and Chickering &
Gregory for Appellant.
Joseph C. Haughey and Toland C. McGettigan for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-In August, 1950, defendant orally agreed
to employ plaintiff on a full time basis in his general contracting business. The agreement was put in writing in
April, 1951, in the form of a letter from defendant to plaintiff,
which provided:
"I hereby offer to employ you as an estimator and office
manager in my general contracting business for a period ot
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one year commencing January 1, 1951, and ending December
31, 1951, upon the following terms and conditions:
"1. I agree to pay you a salary of One Hundred Dollars
($100) per week, together with a sum which when added to
the aforesaid salary will equal thirty (30) percent of my net
profits from said business, before income taxes, but after
deducting all charges and expenses, during said year, and
computed as hereinafter set forth. Said additional sum shall
be payable annually after the completion of the annual audit
of the books of my business, but in any event before March
1, 1952.
"2. In computing the said net profits there shall be excluded all payments received by me from the Drs. A. and E.
Torre for the construction of a building at Gough and Union
streets in San Francisco, California. There shall be included
in computing the net profits, if any, the amount due on all
the jobs which have been fully completed during the year
1951, but on which full paymelit may not have been made
during said year; provided, however, that your share of any
net profits resulting from said jobs shall not be payable until
final payment on such jobs has been received.
"3. It is understood that in determining the net profit
from said business all computations shall be based on [an
accrual] basis of accounting and that the books shall be
audited on a calendar year basis. The final audit as presented
by the accountants shall be conclusive and final in determining
net profits.
"4. It is agreed that in the event you continue in my employ after December 31, 1951, it shall be at a salary of One
Hundred Dollars ($100) per week plus only such amounts,
if any, as may hereafter mutually be agreed upon in writing.
"5. The foregoing agreement is intended to supersede the
oral agreement under which you entered my employ on
August 1, 1950. . . .
"The FOREGOING TERMS are hereby accepted and confirmed.
[signed] E. F. McKeon."
Although no written agreement extending the profit sharing provision of the contract was executed, plaintiff continued
in defendant's employ until February 29, 1952, and he continued to receive $100 per week until his employment terminated. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action to recover
profits alleged to be due under the terms of an oral extension
of the written contract. Defendant denied that any oral extension had been made and deposited $132.64 in court, the
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amount he conceded was still due on 30 per cent of his profits
for 1951.
After a trial before the court sitting without a jury, the
court found that" following the expiration of the said written
agreement of employment . . . plaintiff and defendant, B. L.
Giusto, on or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally
agreed that said agreement would be extended from and after
January 1, 1952, and that the plaintiff would continue in the
employment of said defendant, and said defendant would
continue to employ plaintiff upon the same terms and at the
same rate of compensation specified and set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of said written agreement of employment
• • . , and contrary to and in modification and abandonment
of the provisions of Paragraph 4 .•. , and for such period
of time as would be required to bring to completion those
. • . [three building J projects which were entered upon by
defendant prior to December 31, 1951, but which were not
completed on said date." It also found that on or about
February 26, 1952, "defendant advised plaintiff that he did
not wish to continue with said contract and said defendant
did thereupon and wrongfully and without cause notify plaintiff that his services were no longer wanted or required by
defendant and plaintiff's contract was terminated and at an
end. " Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for
$14,396.28, the amount that the parties stipulated would be
plaintiff's share of the profits from the three jobs started in
1951 but not completed until 1952, under the terms of the
oral extension agreement found to exist by the trial court.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant contends that there is no evidence to support
the finding that an oral agreement extending the written
contract was made and that even if such an agreement was
made, it would be invalid under section 1698 of the Civil
Code.
[1a] Section 1698 provides that "A contract in writing
may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed
oral agreement, and not otherwise." The section presupposes
an existing contract in writing, and accordingly, it does not
invalidate a new oral agreement made after a written contract has expired by its terms or has been orally abrogated.
cancelled, or rescinded by the parties. (Treadwell v. Nickel,
194 Cal. 243, 258-259 [228 P. 25] ; McClure v. Alberti. 190
Cal. 348. 350 f212 P. 2041 : Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314.
325 [95 P. 154, 159]; Burcham v. Caprio, 94 Cal.App.2d 514,
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517 [210 P.2d 877]; Martin v. Butter, 93 Cal.App.2d 562,
566 [209 P.2d 636]; Treat v. Ogden, 56 Cal.App.2d 70,
74-76 [132 P.2d 493] ; Klein Norton 00. v. Oohen, 107 Cal.
App. 325, 331 [290 P. 613] ; Bevans v. Huntington, 65 Cal.
App. 266, 268 [223 P. 572].) [2] In the present case, in
the absence of an agreement extending the written contract,
neither party was bound by its terms after December 31,
1951. After that date plaintiff was free to leave defendant's
employ, and defendant was free to discharge him. Thus, the
contract was at an end on December 31, 1951. unless the
parties agreed that it should continue. [3] It is true that
the fact that plaintiff continued in defendant's employ after
December 31, 1951 would, standing alone, indicate that the
parties had agreed to a continuation of the written contract.
(See Lab. Code, § 3003.) [4] There is substantia] evidence,
however, that the parties did not intend that plaintiff's con·
tinued employment should be compensated at the rate. of
$100 per week as provided in the written contract. Thus,
in December defendant told plaintiff that he would get his
share of the profits on the uncompleted jobs, and plaintiff
continued in defendant's employ after the end of the year in
reliance on this promise. Although the trial court found
that the parties did not execute their new oral agreement
until on or about January 14th, the foregoing evidence clearly
indicates that the parties did not intend that the provisions
of the written contract should be applicable between De·
cember 31, 1951, and the time the new oral agreement was
made, and the trial court was therefore justified in concluding that the written contract expired at the end of the
year. [Ib] Accordingly, section 1698 would not invalidate
any new oral agreement that the parties might make.
[5] It is contended, however, that the findings of the trial
court cannot reasonably be interpreted as determining that
the written contract terminated on December 31, 1951. This
contention is based upon the findings that refer to the oral
agreement as a modification of the written contract and upon
the lack of a finding that the oral agreement superseded the
written contract. The trial court expressly found. however,
that the oral agreement was made on or about the 14th day
of January "following the expiration of the said written
agreement of employment," and as pointed out above. if the
written contract had expired it no longer stood in the way of
the parties entering into a new oral agreement. Moreover.
in view of the finding that the oral agreement was not made
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until after the expiration of the written contract, the findings
with respect to an oral modification of the written contract
may reasonably be interpreted as meaning, not that the oral
agreement was a modification of an existing written contract, but that the new terms of employment were in part
different from those set out in the expired written contract.
Thus, the oral agreement constituted a modification of the
written contract only in the sense that it adopted the provisions thereof with modifications agreeable to both parties.
So interpreted, the findings are consistent and support the
judgment. To iuterpret the references to an oral modification
as constituting findings that an existing written contract
was modified, on the other hand, would create a clear conflict
with the finding that the oral agreement was not made until
after the written contract had expired and would violate the
settled rule that the findings must be considered as a whole
and liberally construed to support the judgment. (Haight
v. Haight, 151 Cal. 90, 92 [90 P. 197] ; Hotaling v. Hotaling,
193 Cal. 368, 385 [224 P. 455] ; Hartford v. Pacific Motor T.
00., 16 Cal.App.2d 378, 381 [60 P.2d 476]; 8nearly v.
Hiestand, 50 Ca1.App. 393, 396 [195 P. 272].)
The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the evidence
sustains the finding of the trial court that on or about January
14th the parties orally agreed that plaintiff should continue
to share in the profits of defendant's business until such
time as the three building projects commenced in 1951 should
be completed. Defendant contends that the evidence shows
only that the parties were negotiating the terms of a new
contract, but that it was understood that no new contract
would become binding until it was reduced to writing and
signed by both parties. [6] It is not uncommon, however,
for parties to make an oral agreement with the intention
to reduce it to writing or supersede it by a new written
contract. In such cases, whether they intended their oral
agreement to be immediately effective or only to become
binding on the execution of the writing, is ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court or jury in the
light of all of the surrounding circumstances. (Empire etc.
Bldgs. 00. v. Harvey Mach. 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 411, 415
[265 P.2d 32] ; Oolumbia Pictu.res Corp. v. De Toth, 87 Cal.
App.2d 620, 629 [197 P.2d 580] ; .Johnston v. 20th OenturyFox Film Oorp., 82 Cal.App.2d 796. 820-821 [187 P.2d 474].)
[7] In the present case plailltiff testified that he talked to
defendant in December~ 1951, about a renewal of his con-
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tract. He pointed out to defendant that some of the jobs
on which he had worked would not be completed in 1951 and
that he wanted to be covered for his percentage of the profits
on those jobs. Defendant told him that he would take the
matter up with his lawyer and not to worry, that he would
get his share on those jobs. Defendant stated at that time
that he would renew the contract. The matter was discussed
by the parties again in the middle of January, at which time
defendant again promised to have a written contract drawn
up and advanced plaintiff $500 as part of his share of the
profits anticipated on a construction job for the Navy, one
of the jobs started in 1951 and due to be completed early
in 1952. In the middle of February, however, defendant told
plaintiff that" I would like to change the set-up and possibly
put you on a salary basis and a bonus arrangement, or something more definite." He stated that the profit sharing
arrangement was unsatisfactory for government work because
government contracts were subject :to renegotiation. Plaintiff
stated that he was unwilling to make any more agreements
until he knew what he "had coming from what was on the
books." There were further conversations, but the parties
were unable to agree on any new terms of employment, and
plaintiff left defendant's employ at the end of February,
after defendant had made it clear that he was unwilling to
continue the profit sharing agreement.
From the foregoing evidence the trial court was justified
in concluding that the parties reached a binding oral understanding in January covering the profits on the jobs commenced in 1951 but not completed until 1952, and that defendant wrongfully terminated this agreement at the end
of February. Thus, in December defendant told plaintiff that
he would get his share of the profits on the uncompleted jobs,
and he must have known when plaintiff continued in his
employ after the end of the year that plaintiff was relying
on his promise. From the fact that in January plaintiff
asked for and was given an advance on the anticipated profits
of the Navy job, the trial court could reasonably infer that
the parties had agreed that the new oral agreement was in
effect. Moreover, the trial court could infer from defendant's
February proposal to change the setup from a profit sharing
to a salary basis that defendant recognized at that time an
existing profit sharing agreement. Finally, the conclusion
that the parties had reached a binding oral understanding
:finds support in the evidence with respect to their de.aljnga

)
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in the past. Thus, when plaintiff first entered defendant's
employ, he worked for eight months under an oral contract
before his agreement was reduced to writing as contemplated
~y the parties.
[8] Defendant contends, however, that the force of the
foregoing evidence was completely destroyed by plaintiff's
uwn testimony, which he interprets as establishing that the
parties never reached a new agreement. This contention
confuses the issue of whether the parties reached a new oral
agreement with respect to the profits for the three jobs started
in 1951 with the question whether they agreed to all of the
terms of a written contract that would integrate or supersede
their oral agreement. It is true that plaintiff testified that
he expected to secure a new written contract and that he
did not consider himself bound to accept whatever written
contract defendant might offer. Thus it appears that there
were certain ambiguities with respect to the meaning of completed jobs and the method of accounting that plaintiff wanted
to have clarified in the new contract, and with respect to
these ambiguities plaintiff testified that the parties never
reached any agreement. It is not contended, however, that
the oral agreement found by the court to exist, was too indefinite to constitute a valid contract, and the fact that the
parties might thereafter be unable to agree on its clarification
would not affect its validity.
[9] Defendant also relies on plaintiff's testimony that he
was unwilling to make any " more" agreements until he
knew what he "had coming from what was on the books."
This testimony, however, referred to plaintiff's response to
defendant's February proposal that the profit sharing arrangement be changed. Plaintiff's refusal at that time to
make any more agreements until he knew what he had coming
is clearly consistent with his position that he was then entitled
to share in the profits under the oral agreement. It indicates
only an unwillingness to change that agreement until he
knew what he would receive under it.
[10] Finally defendant relies on plaintiff's testimony that
he left defendant's employ because "I couldn't get an accounting, and I wasn't going to get any more contract or
any renewal, and I had to think about going out and getting
another job. The rug was pulled out from under me." This
testimony is ambiguous. The phrase "any more contract or
any renewal" might be interpreted as referring to any contract after, or any renewal of, the 1951 contract. It might

Mar. 1955]

McKEON

tJ.

GmSTO

[44 C.2d 152: 280 P.2d 782]

)

161

also be interpreted as referring to any written contract or
renewal after the January 1952 oral contract. It was for
the trial court to resolve this ambiguity in the light of all
of the evidence. Since at the time to which plaintiff referred,
defendant had clearly indicated that he was .lot going to
execute any written profit sharing agreement, as he had
promised to do, or recognize plaintiff's right to share in the
profits on the job not completed in 1951, as he had also promised to do, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial
. court erred in interpreting this testimony as referring to
the new written contract that was to integrate or supersede
the oral agreement.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J' and Carter, J., concurred.
t

)

EDMONDS, J.-The judgment is affirmed upon the theory
that the written contract was term!nated at the end of 1951
and that the parties thereafter made anew, superseding oral
agreement. The trial court made no express finding to that
effect. It is reasoned, however, that such a finding may be
implied from the use of certain phrases, one of which
states that the written contract was orally renewed and modified. Then, under the rule that findings are to be construed
liberally in support of the judgment, the implied finding is
given controlling effect over nearly a dozen express findings
directly in conflict with it.!
IAll of the findings relating to the agreement of January 14th are

as follows. Emphasis is added:
"IV
"That it is true as in Paragraph VII of plaintiff's first cause of
action in his complaint herein alleged and set forth that following the
expiration of the said written agreement of employment made and entered into by said plaintiff and said defendant, B. L. Biusto, on April
11, 1951, as hereinabove set forth, said plaintiff and defendant, B. L.
Giusto, on or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally agreed that
said agreement would be e:z:tended from and after January 1, 1952, and
that the plaintiff would continue in the employment of said defendant,
and said defendant would continue to employ plaintiff upon the same .
terms and at the same rate of compensation spccified and sct forth in
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of said written agreement of employment as
uecuted on April 11, 1951, and contraty to and in modification and
abandonmeflt of the provisions of Paragraph 4 Of said agreement of
employment, and for such period of time as would be required to bring
to completion those certain hereinafter described projects which were
entered upon by defendant prior to Decemher 11, 1951, but which were
not completed on said date, and the court further finds in connection
~th said ora! extension ana modification of said writtea agreemeat that
" c.ad-e

)
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Under the written contract, McKeon was to receive $100
per week plus a percentage of the profits from jobs completed
in 1951. Paragraph 4 provided: "It is agreed that in the
event you continue in my employ after December 31, 1951, it
shall be at a salary of One Hundred Dollars ($100) per week
plus only such amounts, if any, as may hereafter mutually be
agreed upon in writing." It is undisputed, and the trial '-ourt
so found, that McKeon remained in Giusto '8 employ con·
tinuously until February 29, 1952.
In his complaint for "moneys due" filed in April of that
year, McKeon sought an accounting to enable him to ascertain
"the amount of money remaining due to him under and pursuant to said agreement of employment made and entered
into by and between plaintiff and defendant on the 11th day
of April, 1951, as aforesaid, and as thereafter extended and

)

said defendant ••. did thereupon and repeatedly thereafter represilllt,
state to, and advise plaintiff that he . . . would cause the terms of said
agreement as orally modified and extended to be reduced to writing and
the plaintiff remained in said defendant's employ on and after December
31, 1951, pursuant to the terms, conditions and promises of the oral
modification 01 said written agreement and in consideration thereof and
in the belief and upon the understanding and representations of defendant that said oral agreement would be immediately placed in writing.

"V
"The Court finds that it is true that plaintiff under and pursuant
to said written agreement 01 employment and the Mal extension and
modification thereof as hereinabove found and set forth, performed and
rendered work, labor and services for said defendant, .•. from the date
of January 1. 1951, up to and including the 29th day of February.
1952. . . .

"VI
"That from and after December 31, 1951 to and including February
29, 1952, the defendant requested, permitted and allowed plaintiff to
remain and continue in defendant's employment .•• and led plaintiff
to believe that said employment of plaintiff by defendant was to continue until completion I)f the said projects, and that plaintiff was to be
compensated at the same rate and upon the same terms as set forth in
that certain written agreement between plaintiff and defendant. . • .
"VII
"The court further finds that su usequeut to December 31, 1951. and
while plaintiff remained in the employ of defendant, B.L.Giusto, under
and pursuant to said written contract of employment as orally extended,
modified and executed. as hereinabove found, plaintiff repeatedly requested defendant to proviue a new contract in writing pursuant to the
oral agreement of plaintiff and defendant, but that said defendant,
although promising so to do, failed and leglected to produce 8uch
written contract.
"VIII
"The court further finds that prior and subsequent to December 31,
1951, and while plaintiff remained in the employ of said defendant, B. L.
Giusto, under and pursuant to said written contract of employment as
orally extended and modified as hcrpinahove found, plaintiff repeatedly
requested said defendant to provide plaintiff with a final audit. •••
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continued. " He pleaded the making of the written contract
and alleged that the parties "orally agreed to extend said
agreement and to continue said plaintiff in his employment
upon . • • terms • • • contrary to and in modification of the
provisions of Paragraph 4 of said agreement of employment."
Findings were made in favor of McKeon upon the theory
of a breach of the written contract as extended and modified
by a completely executed oral agreement. Specifically, the
breach was found to have resulted from Giusto's wrongful
discharge of McKeon which prevented him from performing
the conditions "of the said agreement so made and entered
into by and between plaintiff and defendant on the 11th day
of April, 1951, as heretofore found, and as thereafter and on
"X

)

)

"The court further finds that on or about the 26th day of February,
1952, and while said plaintiff was continuing to perform work, labor
and services for the defendant, and while said plaintiff was awaiting the
delivery to him of an agreement in writing covering his extended employment ••• defendant advised plaintiff that he did not wish to continue with said contract • • • and plaintiff's contract was terminated and
at end.
.
"XI
"That it is true that plaintiff had at all times performed and was
at all times and on said 26th day of February, 1952, ready willing able
to continue to perform all conditions of the said agreement so made
and entered into by and between pZaintiff and defendant on the 11th
day of .April, 1951, as heretofore found, and as thereafter and on or
about the 14th day of January, 1952, of'ally modified and extended as
of January 1, 1952, and as thereafter e:z:ecuted, on his part required
to be performed but that plaintiff was prevented therefrom by defendant ••••
"XV
"The court further finds that prior to December 31, 1951, said defendant commenced work upon projects and/or jobs described as follows.•••
"That plaintiff, at the instance and request of defendant, continued
to render and perform and rendered and performed ••• labor and services upon each of said projects .•. from and after December 31, 1951,
and up to and including the 29th day of February, 1952, upon the understanding and agreemeut that he, the said plaintiff would be compensated
therefor in accordance with the terms and provisions of his said agreement with defendant as first written and as thereafter mOllified and
ea:tended and carried out and executed as hereinabove found.
"XXIII
"The court finds that said written contract of April 11, 1951, was a
valid and binding contract.
"XXIV
"The court finds that the oral agreement entered into by and between
plaintif-' and defendant, B. L. Giusto, also known as Ben L. Giusto,
on or about January 14, 1952, altering, amending and modifying the
provisions of paragraph (4) of xaid written. agl'eement as hereinabove
found, was thereafter executed by both of eaid parties and was a valid
and binding agreement."
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or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally modified and
extended as of January 1, 1952, and as thereafter executed
••.. " Throughout the findings the basis of Giusto's liability
is stated to be "the oral modification of said written agreement," "said written agreement of employment and the oral
extension and modification thereof," and phrases of similar
import.
The basis for implying a superseding oral agreement is
the portion of finding IV which states that "following the
expiration of the said written agreement of employment"
the parties" orally agreed" upon terms" contrary to and in
modification and abandonment of the provisions of Paragraph
4. " The word "expiration" is construed as meaning an
abandonment of the terms of the written contract as of
December 31, 1951. In that situation, it is said, the oral
agreement of January 14th necessarily must be a superseding
one.
To construe "expiration" as meaning an "abandonment"
of the terms of the written contract is to contradict directly
the express findings which state that the written contract was
renewed and extended. Those findings are consistent with
section :3003 of the fJabor Code, which reads: "If, after the
expiration of an agreement respecting wages and term of service, the parties continue the relation of master and servant,
they are presumed to have renewed the agreement for the same
wages and term of service." (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed, and so found by the trial court, that McKeon remained in Giusto's employ for two weeks after December 31,
1951, and before the purported oral agreement was made. In
that situation, a renewal of the original contract will be implied in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary
or an amrmative showing that the parties did not so intend.
(Henkel v. J. J. Henkel Co., 212 Cal. 288, 291-292 [298 P.
28] ; lV1'lliams v. Schalk Chemical Co., 11 Cal.App.2d 396,
397-398 [53 P.2d 10151; Lemley v. Doak Gas Engine Co.,
40 Cal.App. 146, 149 [180 P. 671] ; Lab. Code, § 3003.)
There is no contractual provision contravening the findings
which state that the original agreement was renewed. Instead, the written contract expressly contemplated McKeon's
continuing employment bryontl 1951. Paragraph 4 provided
that "in the event you fl\TeKeon] continue in my employ
after December 31. 1951. it shall be at a salary of One Hundred Dollars ($100) pCI' ,,:(~ek plus only such amounts, if any,
as may hereafter mutually be agreed upon in writing."
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The majority reason that "the [vI'Titten] contract was at
an end on December 31, 1951, unless the parties agreed that
it should continue. Under its terms, however, it could continue only if plaintiff agreed to continue working for $100 per
week, or the parties agreed in wrltmg un additional
amounts. " I am unable to find in the contract "terms"
making a continuation of its provisions dependent upon an
agreement as to salary. That matter was fixed in paragraph
4 as being "One Hundred Dollars ($100) per week plus only
such amounts, if any, as may hereafter mutually be agreed
upon in writing." The only condition precedent to the operation of that provision was that "you continue in my employ
after December 31, 1951," which unquestionably McKeon did.
It is suggested also that there is "substantial evidence . . .
that the parties did not intend that plaintiff's continued employment should be compensated at the rate of $100 per week
as provided in the written contract." This evidence, it is
said, "clearly indicates that the parties did not intend that
the provisions of the written contract should be applicable
between December 31, 1951 and the time the new oral agreement was made, and the trial court was therefore justified
in concluding that the written contract expired at the end of
the year."
The trial court, however, made no finding that the parties
intended to abandon the provisions of the written contract
after 1951. On the contrary, it expressly found that the
contract was renewed and extended. Whether the testimony
relied upon as indicating an intention to abandon the written
contract is sufficient to support such an inference is questionable. 2 Certainly, it is not so clearly persuasive as to
require the contrary finding to be disregarded.
The pleadings were framed and findings were made upon
the theory of an oral modification of the extended written
·McKeon was asked if he had a conversation with Giusto in December,
1951, "concerning the extension of the written contract of employment."
McKeon replied that he did and stated:
"On or about the middle of December I told Mr. Giusto that the
contract was expiring at the end of the year, and asked him if he
would have it renewed, making those corrections that we had discussed
back in April on an accrued basis of accounting; and also to clarify
those 'complete jobs' .••• I wanted to be sure tllat I was covered for
my percentage of those jobs, and so advised him. And he said he would
take the matter up with the lawyer, and not to worry about it; that I
would get my share of these jobs. . . . "
McKeon was asked: "Did Mr. Giusto state to you at that time, and in
that eonversation, Mr. McKeon, that he would lelleW your eontzactl"
r~ waa. "lIe did."
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agreement. Although the findings should be construed
liberally in support of the judgment, that principle does not
allow a strained construction of them in order to reach what
may appear to be an equitable result.
I would reverse the judgment.
SchauerJ J., and Spence, J.J concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied AprD 13,
1955. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spene~, J.. were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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